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THE HANDMAIDEN'S REVENGE: ON
READING AND USING THE NEWER




This symposium offers an opportunity to present some important
developments in the empirical study of civil disputes, litigation, and
procedure. In recent years, a few scholars working in the Law and Society
tradition have outlined a new approach to the study of these phenomena and
have articulated new themes that challenge conventional understandings of
the social role of law. This article seeks to clarify this approach-which shall
be called the "critical sociology of civil procedure"--and outline some themes
emerging in recent Law and Society literature.
There are two fundamental ideas that make these newer studies
distinctive. The first is an altered view of the relationship between law and
subjectivity. Legal thought has long been concerned with this relationship,
and the question of how law and the human subject intersect has existed for a
long time. However, most discussions of this question have, implicitly or
explicitly, taken the nature of the subject, and the relationship between law
and subjectivity, as unproblematic. While conventional legal and sociological
thought assumes that subjects approach the law with preconstituted aims that
the law seeks to foster, critical sociology of civil procedure explores ways in
which law simultaneously creates the subject and yet denies authentic
subjectivity.
The second fundamental idea adopted in the newer literature is that social
research is part of the process by which social reality is constructed. Earlier
understandings have seen the nature of empirical research in legal studies as
the mirroring of a preexistent reality, designed to bring to light objective and
possibly invariant laws of human interaction. Rejecting this notion, the
critical sociology of civil procedure posits that social research is one of the
ways we construct society.
A truly critical approach to the study of civil disputes was born when these
two themes-the legal construction of the subject and the construction of
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society through knowledge-were united. This union affects the way scholars
define their roles and conceive the object of their study. Several scholars in
the Law and Society tradition who study disputes and civil litigation have
come to accept this approach. Thus, it is reasonable to speak of a critical
sociology of civil procedure.
To understand a critical perspective in social thought, one must
understand the classical jurisprudential tradition against which the critics
react. The basic premise of this article is that the newer Law and Society
literature is a critique of the social vision of self, society, and law that
underlies much of our thinking about civil procedure today. This social vision
is a set of ideas about the nature of personhood, the function of law, and the
operation of procedure, which was articulated in the nineteenth century and
which has survived, with some significant modifications introduced by Legal
Realism, to the present. Part II of the article sets forth the original
nineteenth-century social vision; Part III discusses the modifications
introduced by Realism. Following these introductory discussions in which the
social vision underlying mainstream thought is sketched out, the article turns
to the critical work itself. Part IV introduces two major developments in
recent social theory that have led some Law and Society scholars to raise basic
questions concerning the mainstream social vision. Part V presents an outline
of the newer work by identifying six themes that can be seen in the literature:
(1) law's denial of an authentic self; (2) the legal construction of self and
society; (3) victimization of victims through law; (4) the communitarian
alternative and the critique of adjudication; (5) the critique of alternative
dispute resolution ("ADR") and the discourses of need; and (6) the
discursivity of social knowledge.
II
TRANSPARENT PROCEDURE: A PROVISIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF LAW FOR
CIVIL PROCEDURE
To identify the social vision underlying mainstream thought about
procedure, one must first understand the nineteenth-century social vision,
many elements of which still animate current thinking. To gain such an
understanding, one must look back at what shall be called, following the work
of several legal historians, the age of "classical legal thought,"' a mode of
thinking about law whose influence spans a 100-year period from the mid-
nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century.2  The social vision underlying
1. This term is taken from Kennedy, Toward a Undertandiog of Legal Conscioustess: The Case of
Classical Legal Thought in imerica, 1850-1940, in 3 RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGN- 3 (1980). For
further development of the idea of classical legal thought, see Singer, The Legal Righls Debate in
.Inalyticalutropidencefi-om Bentham to Ho/feld 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975. See also Singer. Legal Realism
Vow (Book Review), 76 CALIF. .. REV. 465 (1988).
2. Identification of periods is an imprecise process in intellectual history. Kennedy pinpointed
the beginning of classical legal thought in 1850 and its end in 1940. Kennedy, sipra note 1, at 3.
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classical legal thought still influences current thinking about procedure, and it
is important to understand the principles that animated classical thought and
trace their implications in the realm of civil procedure.
Unfortunately, no such account is currently available. There have been a
number of studies that have sought to identify the basic ideas about law and
society that dominated in the classical period.3 No one, however, has worked
out the procedural implications of these ideas. Thus, the account needed to
begin this story must be created, not found. This section provides a
provisional sketch, deriving notions of procedure from the more basic ideas of
the nature, function, and operation of law that prevailed in the classical
period. This sketch will represent the idea of "transparent procedure."
A. Classical Legal Thought'
Classical legal thought was based on three fundamental commitments: an
individualist understanding of personhood, a liberal theory of society, and a
formalist understanding of law. To understand why these commitments lead
to a notion of the transparency of procedure, one must examine each of them
and see how they interrelate.
1. Personhood. 5 In classical thought, the person, and thus the legal subject,
is a fully constituted, self-contained actor capable of autonomous choice. Not
all human beings meet these standards of personhood, so that not all can be
legal subjects. For example, children, married women, and the insane cannot
be subjects in this sense. On the other hand, those who pass the test of
personhood, such as white males, are presumed to be capable of acting in
accordance with a set of values that they have freely chosen. In classical
thought, these values and the choices to which they lead exist wholly
independently of the law.
2. Liberalism." In a liberal society, the purpose of law is to protect the
autonomy of the individual. Thus, the law must be designed to ensure that
individuals are free to exercise the choices that they make, subject to a like
freedom on the part of all others. To ensure that freedom, the law confers
powers on individuals and provides immunities from the deprivations of
3. See snpia note I and sources cited therein. See also Peller, The .llelaplhysics of American Law, 73
CALIF. ., REV. 1151. 1193-219 (1985).
4. The account of classical legal thought in this section is a synthesis drawn from many sources.
For the most important of these sources, see supra note I and sources cited therein; R. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGF AND Poi.Tit:s (1975); R. UNGER. LAW IN MOIERN SOCIETY (1976); 2 M. \VEBER, EcoNoslY
AND SOCIETY 641-900 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1980): Kennedy, Form and Snbstance in Privale La7'
.Ieludication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). For an interpretation of Weber's views on classical legal
thought, which Weber called formal legal rationality, see Trubek, Max ll'ebers Tragic .llodeiism and the
Study of law in Society, 20 LAW & Soc'V REv. 573 (1986).
5. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AN) POLITICS, supra note 4, at 29-62; R. UNGER, l.W IN NIODERN
SOCIETY, sipa note 4, at 23-37.
6. The classic account of this argument can be found inJ. LOCE , Two TR.AcIS OF GOVFERNNIENT r
(P. Abriams ed. 1967). For a c,'itique of the autonomous subject of liberalism. see M. SANDEI.,
i.usF RAIISM AND T1 l LM rs OF.IUSTICE 15-65 (1982). See also Peller, supa note 3. at 1193-207.
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others. Thus, liberalism is not anarchy but rather a system of ordered liberty.
It requires a system of law in which some actions chosen by individuals can be
prohibited. The law, however, must distinguish between a sphere in which
the individual can remain free of all external constraint and a sphere in which
such constraint is not only permissible but necessary, because without such a
distinction, one person's freedom will become another's domination.
3. Formalism. 7 In order for law to protect the individual and to serve
ordered liberty, it must be formal in its operation. It must be able to delimit
the spheres of freedom and regulation correctly; to define the scope of
powers and immunities clearly; and to operate predictably. If the spheres are
defined incorrectly, the law will not bring about the desired optimal liberty. If
the boundaries of powers and immunities are not clear, and if the responses
of legal institutions are not predictable, actors will not be able fully to exercise
their autonomy for fear of incurring sanctions. A formal system of justice is
simply a name for a legal system that can draw correct lines and adhere to
them. Law is conceived as a set of statements from which specific rules
covering all social interactions can be derived through techniques that all who
have the proper training can use to reach the same result. For those who
adhere to formalism, legal knowledge is both determinant and objective:
There is one right answer and everyone must accept it.
B. Transparent Procedure
The classical theory of law presupposed that subjects were autonomous
and preconstituted. Further, it assumed that the law established clear and
determinate spheres in which they could-or could not-exercise free and
unconstrained choice. The boundaries of these spheres were set by rights
that derived from legal rules.8 These rights had to be clear and knowable,
because otherwise the individual would not know the boundaries of the
sphere of autonomy that the whole system was designed to protect. '-
In such a system, procedure is a medium through which the correct rule is
applied to the facts of a dispute. Given the premises of formalism, there must
be a correct rule for any set of facts. And given the premises of liberalism, it
will-from time to time-be necessary to apply these rules to those who
intrude on protected spheres.
Anyone who accepts these principles must think of procedure not simply
as a medium, but as a transparenl medium-one that does not add or subtract
anything. The rules of a formalist system are already there. The correct rule
is not made; rather, it is discovered through procedure. Procedure should
not make a difference in the outcome of a dispute. It should simply ensure
that the system generates the right answer, an answer which, by hypothesis, is
7. For i desciti m i( offormalism as ai Component of Classical legal thought, see Singer, Legal
Realism .Vow. supra note 1, at 496-99.
8. See Kennedy, su/na note 4; Singer, Leg~a Realism .\oz', sup note 1, al 475-95.
9. See Kenned, /supra note 4, at 1728-31.
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already present in the determinant system of formal law. Classical thought
demands a procedural system that minimizes the chance of mistakes in
selection of the right legal principle or determination of the correct facts, but
it assumes that there are such principles and facts, so that transparency is a
realizable goal.
Another feature of transparency is the idea that procedure should have no
effect on the values, goals, and desires of those who use the system. By
hypothesis, the legal subjects of classical thought come to the law with their
goals already determined; the law should either support their claims or reject
them. The law should not attempt to change their goals or their reasons for
these goals, for to do that would violate the principle of autonomous
personhood and the idea that the law serves only to carry out the goals chosen
by individuals. Transparent procedure takes the litigants as they come to the
court.
Classical legal scholars did not have a conscious concept of procedural
transparency because it never occurred to them that procedure should be
anything else but transparent. This does not mean that in the classical era no
one worried about procedure; of course people did. But the author's
hypothesis-and without further historical study it can be no more than that-
is that in classical thought the goals of procedure were relatively
unproblematic. Procedure was to be the handmaiden ofjustice, as justice was
defined in classical thought. That definition implied that procedure should be
a scientific instrument designed to identify the correct principle and
determine the true facts. It should ensure that subjects can both invoke
known rules in appropriate situations and be sure that these rules are
enforced. If procedure erects barriers to the invocation of preexisting rights,
or skews the outcomes dictated by the appropriate rules, it has failed in its
role of handmaiden.
This attempt to deduce a theory of procedure from the premises of
classical legal thought may make classical legal scholars sound naive. Could
they really have thought that people who sought to use the the law would
remain unaffected by their contact with it? Could they have imagined that
procedure had no impact on the substantive outcome of cases? The author
doubts that thev, were so naive. But that is not the point. The question is not
how they assessed the actual legal institutions of their day, but whether they
thought transparency was a feasible and desirable goal. The author, although
unable to prove it, thinks that they did. Certainly, for a long period in history,
the legal elite believed in the classical idea of law,'" and the notion of
transparency is simply a deduction from the premises of that idea. To the
extent that classical legal theorists thought about procedure at all, therefore,
they must have imagined that what has been called transparency was a viable
goal even if it was not a present reality.
10. .See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 4-5: Singer, [.egal Realism .Now. supra note I, at 478-82.
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III
LEGAL REALISM AND THE ORIGINS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Legal Realism ushered in a new era in legal thought. The Realists altered
some aspects of the classical account of law, while retaining others.' They
rejected the classical picture of legal knowledge as objective and determinant,
while holding onto the classical notion of the autonomous subject. This shift
in theories about law had a direct impact on procedural thought. The idea of
procedural transparency, which rested on classical premises regarding the
determinacy of legal knowledge, ceased to make sense. In its place came the
forthright recognition that procedure and substance were inextricably
intertwined.
One of the results of Realist thought about civil procedure was the
development of empirical research on civil litigation and procedure. As is
well known, the Realists, led by Charles E. Clark, initiated the tradition of
empirical study of courts, litigants, and litigators and conducted the first
systematic social scientific studies of procedure. '2 The Realist era gave rise to
the idea of empirical research as an auxiliary to civil procedure reform: a
handmaiden's handmaiden, as it were. This tradition was taken up by the Law
and Society movement in the 1960's.' Today's critical sociology of
procedure continues and at the same time seeks to reshape that tradition.
The Realists' interest in empirical research was not limited to civil
procedure; empirical research was central to the Realist program for reasons
that transcend its role in procedure.' 4 Moreover, the changes in thinking
about civil procedure that the Realists initiated did not, by themselves,
necessarily point to empirical research, any more than classical thought would
have precluded empiricism. However, the Realists' views about law, which
questioned the determinacy of rights and highlighted the inseparability of
procedure and substance,' 5 made empirical research appear more important
than it would have seemed to classical theorists. And these views helped
shape the agenda of empirical study that emerged after Realism.
A. The Indeterminacy of Rights
Classical legal thought assumed that rights were knowable. Classical
theorists thought of legal doctrine as unequivocal; they assumed that there
was a determinate method that could be employed to identify the correct rule
11. See Singer, Legal Realism Vow, supra note 1, at 482-95.
12. For a thorough discussion of early Realist-inspired studies and Clark's role, see Schlegel,
American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science From the Yale Expeoetice, 28 BIUFFALO L. R .v. 459,
491-569 (1979).
13. The empirical research on litigation by I.aw and Society scholars is voluminous. For a
survey and useful bibliography of work up to 1680-8 1, see Special'Issue on Dispite Piocessing and Civil
Litigation, 13 LAW & Soc' REv. 391 (1980-81).
14. For a Itllcr analysis, see Trubek & Esser, "Citiral Empiricism iii .- merican Legal Studies:
Paradox, Progiam, or Pandoma Box?, 14 LAW & Soc. INOUIRY 3, 8-10 (1989).
15. See iq/ia notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
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for any given set of facts. Furthermore, facts were thought of as objective,
and questions of fact and law were presumed to be distinct. Thus, procedure
would serve its function and be completely transparent as long as it led to a
finding of the true facts and application of the correct rules.
Realist thought made procedure seem more important and yet more
problematic than it had appeared in the classical understanding. The Realists
argued that legal doctrine contains alternative and often conflicting answers
to legal questions, so that often there is no one correct answer.'" They
believed that verbal formulations of legal rules and concepts could never be
precise and fixed enough so that they would necessarily generate clear
answers to novel questions. 17 Realists saw that there was no bright line
between fact and law, and that the choice of the appropriate legal rule should
only be made after a full analysis of the factual situation in dispute. " Finally,
they recognized that the process of adjudication frequently, if not always,
involves contextual and situational analyses in which questions of policy must
be considered in light of the particular facts of specific disputes. "'
B. Effect on Thinking About Procedure
Revisions of the classical understanding had a subtle impact on thought
regarding the nature and importance of procedure. To Realists, procedure
seemed even more important than it did to classical theorists because it was
inextricably linked to substance. Realism made it clearer that adjudication
involved lawmaking, even if that was seen to be interstitial. Due to the
Realists' view of the indeterminacy of rights and the contextual nature of legal
judgment, this sort of micro-lawmaking seemed to be desirable and not
anomalous or improper.
In this context, transparency could no longer be the sole goal of
procedure. If every lawsuit was a micro-lawmaking process in which rules
were defined and redefined in light of a rich understanding of social context,
if concepts of fact and law were not objective categories but were to be
defined relative to each other, and if in any situation there were multiple and
possibly conflicting rules the court might draw on, then the clear line between
substance and procedure which classical thought had drawn would have to be
reconsidered. Once that was done, procedure began to seem both more
16. See, e.g., Ilewellyn, Some Realism .- bout Realism-Responi ng lo Dean Pound. 44 HARV. L REX'.
1222 (1931).
17. See, e.g., Cohen, T7anscenden al .\'onsense and the Fumctional .Ipproarh, 35 Coiusi. L. REv. 809
(1935).
18. See generallv Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Staudards foi Rule II Sanctions. 100 HARV. L.
REv. 630. 645-47 (1987).
19. The Harvard note describes this very well:
I [The Realists I believed that legal rules grew out of the factual circumstances of the cases to
which they applied .... According to the [R ealists. judges create new rules of law every
time they decide cases . . . . [0ince law is understood as logically indeterminate, judges,
institutional authority plays a larger role in doctrinal decision making .... [IJludges did not
merely perceive the law-they made it.
i. at 646-47.
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important and more complex than it had in classical thought. It was no longer
just a question of setting up machinery to get the true facts and the correct
rule, since these did not exist, at least in the classical sense.
This shift in thought had many ramifications. For present purposes, the
most important was to highlight the utility of empirical research on the
operation of the courts. Post-Realist thinking about civil procedure
highlighted the importance that differences in procedural arrangements could
have on substantive outcomes. Since it became accepted that various
doctrinal answers were available and different "factual" accounts plausible,
post-Realist legal science could not provide the one correct solution against
which actual outcomes could be measured. In this context, attention shifted
to questions of process and participation. Instead of measuring procedure by
whether it produced the "correct" outcome, post-Realist thought tended to
evaluate procedure in terms of the opportunities it provided for full
participation of affected interests. Empirical research seemed to be a useful, if
not indispensible, tool in this task. Thus, it is no surprise that studies of
process and participation flowered in the Law and Society research that began
in the post-Realist period..2 '
Indubitably, the classic in this genre was Marc Galanter's widely cited
article entitled "Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead." 2' While the somewhat
polemical title might suggest that Galanter was conducting a class-based
analysis of substantive bias in civil litigation, the study actually focuses on the
fairness of adjudicative and quasi-adjudicative processes. Moreover, while
Galanter identified structural features of litigation practices and procedures
that tended to favor organizational over individual litigants,22 he thought
these barriers to a fair process could be overcome by adjustments in civil
procedure and through provision of certain kinds of subsidized advocacy..2 3
Thus, it is possible to argue that Legal Realism fostered a sociology of civil
procedure. Moreover, one can describe this sociology as a critical practice, in
a sense. After all, it was because procedure had become more salient and
problematic that empirical inquiry into its operations and effects seemed so
important to post-Realist scholars. However, the scope of this critical practice
was rather limited, at least in light of recent developments. First, much of the
work took the goals and aspirations of the procedural system at face value.
Scholars recognized that things might not work out in practice as expected,
but they accepted the view that the system was committed to its ostensible
20. The emphasis on process was apparent in the proliferation of studies of access to justice, a
major theme in L.aw and Society research. See, e.g., Acc~ss TO.JUsiIcE AND T HE WELFARE STxirE (M.
Cappelletti ed. 1981). See a&o Cappelletti & Garth, .Access toJustice: The .Vewesl Wave m the Ioildwide
Movement to Make R ghts iective, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 181 (1978).
21. Galanter, W 'hy the "lHaves- Come Out Ahead: Speculatios on the l.imits oJ Legal Change, 9 lw &
Soc'v REV. 95 (1974).
22. 1I. at 119-24.
23. Id. at 135-44.
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goals.2 4 For example, Galanter never really questioned that, once it was
shown that his "haves" really came out ahead, someone would want to do
something about it.25 Similarly, Wayne Brazil's study of discovery abuse, one
of the most vehement empirical criticisms of the operation of civil procedure
produced in recent years, seems to assume that, if we can demonstrate that
discovery is being used for purposes inconsistent with its alleged goals,
reform will follow. 2"
The second limiting feature of the post-Realist sociology of civil procedure
was its tendency to accept the classical idea of the autonomous subject.
Although Law and Society scholars had incorporated all of the Realist
critiques of classical thought, this feature of the older tradition was not really
questioned. A few studies did begin to explore how lawyers manipulated
clients,2 7 but by and large it was taken for granted that subjects came to the
legal process with fully constituted aims untainted by contact with legal
institutions or legal ideology.
IV
THEORETICAL SHIFTS-QUESTIONING THE SUBJECT
Contemporary social and legal theory has raised questions about the
liberal idea of the self and the role of law in self-empowerment and, thus, has
put into question fundamental aspects of the post-Realist account of civil
procedure that is grounded on such liberal notions. These theoretical
developments have influenced the critical sociology of law, leading scholars to
ask new questions and articulate new themes. Two major ideas have been
central to this process: the discursive constitution of subjectivity and the
contextual nature of the self.
The term "discursive constitution of subjectivity" refers to the idea that
the self is not a natural entity independent of social relations, but rather is
created through social practices, or discourses. Where classical liberalism
posited a natural self, many strands in post-liberal thought emphasize the
socially created nature of our subjectivity. Some who embrace this idea take it
to the point of denying the existence of anything one could properly call self.
This is the position usually associated with the French philosopher Michel
24. For ant elaboration on this view, see Silbev & Sarat, Citical I'radiions in Law and Society
Reseatrh, 21 LAW & Soc"y Rt.. 165 (1987): Silbev & Sarat. The Pll of the Policy .-hidienre, 10 LAw &
PoC'" 97 (1988). See also Trubek & Esser. supna note 14. ,rt 14-19.
25. See Galanter, supra note 21, at 135-44. Post-Realist Law and Society work shows an implicit
faith in the iability and normative correctness of liberal legalism. In other words. the underlving
values of the system were never questioned; justice was viewed as a determinate concept with fixcd
meaning rather than as a symbolic construciion that could he used hv various groups both to advance
ideological programs and to ignore entirely calls for social change.
26. See Brazil, ITe .dversaty Chart/e of C1il DIscoz'erv,: A Critique of Proposalv for Change, 31 VAN].
L. Rixv. 1295 (1978).
27. See, e.g., Blucrmberg, Te Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Oratiza/tiota Coop/ation of a
P1oetson. IoLAW & Soc:'v Rt.v., Icinc 1967. at 15: Nlacaulay, loovers and Constmet Protection Laws, 14 l.Aw
& Soc'V Rriv. 115 (1979).
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Foucault.2-' Foucault sees the individual as nothing more than the result of
"disciplinary power. - t' For Foucault there is no self, but only individuals who
are simply the product of various disciplinary practices and discourses.""
Foucaultian themes appear in the critical sociology of procedure. But the
notion of discursive constitution of subjectivity is not necessarily limited to
Foucault's bleak picture of the disappearance of the subject. It also is
associated with another idea which can be called the contextual self. Some
social theorists who reject liberal premises about the subject have put forth an
alternative account of the subject, one that stresses the importance of
relations and social contexts rather than isolation and autonomy. Authors
who posit the contextual self criticize the liberal notions of rights and thus of
rights enforcement as inconsistent with genuine self-empowerment."'
The idea of a contextual self has many roots and appears today in many
versions, but a particularly powerful and relevant example of this notion
appears in the recent work of Roberto Mangabeira Unger. In a short volume
called Passion - and in an extensive treatise entitled Politics, '" Unger has
developed a concept of the contextual self and a social theory that is aimed at
creating the conditions for empowerment of such a subject. For Unger, the
self is a source of infinite possibilities, but these possibilities can only be
realized within contexts-that is, in personal and political relationships.3 4 To
empower the contextual self, it is essential to create conditions of trust,
solidarity, and "plasticity," or institutional revisabilityY 5 Because liberalism
fails to grasp the contextual nature of authentic selfhood, Unger argues, it
stresses the negative values of freedom from social constraint while
underplaying the importance of constructing institutions that foster trust,
solidarity, and plasticity. :"1
28. See generalr N4. FOUCAULT. DIscIPLINE AND PUNISH (1977); NI. FOUCAULT, -l't;E HISTORY OF
SEXUA.ITY (R. Hutrley trans. 1978); M. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOwIEt)(IGE: SEFI.EC'tx INTERVIEWS AND
01IIER WRIrINGS (C. Gordon ed. 1980). A key element of Foucault's work is the relationship
between power and knowledge, which is integral to redefining the individual as an obedient subject.
As the body becomes a target for nCe\ and refined mechanisms of power, it is offered I) to new forms
of knowledge. The individual can be known, described, compared to the norm, and therefore
controlled. Legal disconrse is only one discourse among many thai are part of this process of
normalization.
29. N4. FOtCAtLT, POWER/KNOWLEI)GE, spna note 28, at 156, 170.
30. This argument is developed most forcefully in N1. Fouc.su.r, tPOWFR/KNoWVLEc;.GE, su/na note
28. See also H. DREYFUS & P. RABINO\W, MICHEi FOUCAUI:i BEYOND STRiICTURALISM AND
HFRMINEUTICS 143-68 (1983).
31. See general Gabel, The P1/esnomesoologiv of R hs-Conscioisness and the Pact (?f the Wi'ilhdiaw Selves.
62 lEx. . REV. 1563 (1984). For a related perspective that criticizes the Kantian foundations of
liberalism and the theoretical limits of a liberal definition of the self', see M. SANDE[., ssspra note 6, at
14, 50-65. 175-83.
32. R. UNGRt. PASSION: AN EssAY ON PERSONALITY (1984).
33. R. UNGER. Pot ics: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL I'HEORY (1987) (three vols.).
34. See R. UNGER, sl//na note 32, at 5-22.
35. See R. UNGER, PI.Asricrt INT0 POWER 1-2 (1987); R. UNGER, SOCIAlT.-OR\Y: ITS SITUATION
AND ITS T.SK 1- 17 (1987). See a/so R. UNGER., ThE CRITICAt, LEc.GAI. STUI)ES NIOVEMEN-r 25-42 (1986).
36. For a summary of Unger's views, see Trubek, Progsasssaic Totsgh asnd I/e Critique ofthe Social
l)ssilil,, in C lrTt QU ENt) CNONSTRUCTIION (M. Petrv ed. Forthconing 1989).
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The themes of discursive constitution of subjectivity and the contextual
nature of the self have affected legal scholarship in recent years. They can be
seen, for example, in the much-debated (and frequently misunderstood)
Critical Legal Studies "critique of rights." : 7 Authors working in this tradition
have argued that rights discourse presumes that individuals have full,
autonomous access to an understanding of their natural interests, thus
ignoring the way social practices and ideologies construct these very
understandings.3 Furthermore, the critique of rights draws attention to the
relational and contextual nature of selfhood, criticizing legal practices that
individualize conflict and isolate disputes from the social contexts and
relations in which they are embedded.'"
T hose who accept the discursive nature of subjectivity and the relational
nature of the self must question those aspects of the classical account of civil
procedure that were left untouched by the Realist critiques. They are forced
to recognize that the legal system, broadly conceived, may contribute to the
constitution of the subject, rather than merely fostering (or frustrating) the
ends of a preconstituted and autonomous self. At the same time, they must
confront the fact that the legal system, as currently conceived, may deny the
relational or contextual nature of the self, thus frustrating the realization of
authentic selfhood. These broad ideas undergird the scholarly tradition
herein called the critical sociology of civil procedure. They have generated a
series of new themes. The next part of this article outlines these themes.
V
EMERGING THEMES IN THE CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF PROCEDURE
Affected by these developments in social theory, legal sociologists have
articulated a series of critiques of litigation, procedure, and social research
itself. These are: (1) the denial of the authentic self; (2) the legal
construction of social reality; (3) the victimization of the victim through law;
(4) the communitarian alternative and the critique of adjudication; (5) the
critique of ADR and the discourses of need; and (6) the discursivity of social
knowledge.
A. Denial of the Authentic Self
As previously discussed, post-Realist thought accepts the classical notion
that the purpose of substantive civil law is to empower the self. As the
handmaiden to substantive law, procedure shares this goal. 40 The first theme
in the newer literature is the questioning of this notion.
37. See generallv Gabel, supra note 31;- [ushnet, .-In Essai' on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363 (1984).
For critiques of the critique of rights, see .linotit Critiques a] the Critical Lqal Studies .Movement. 22
HARV. C.R.-Cl I.. REV. 297 (1987).
38. See Gabel, supra note 31 Villtroare, The Left 1v Problems with Rghts, 9 LE GAL SiUD ]o. F3 ) 42-46
(1985).
39. See G;bel. supra note 31; ltishnet, supra note 37.
40. See supa notes 20-27 anld accompanying text.
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This theme emerges with clarity in recent writings on lawyer-client
relationships. The sociology of law has long been concerned with this topic.
It has recognized that there are potential conflicts between the interests of
lawyers and clients. But the literature has tended to focus on ways in which
this conflict can be reduced or eliminated by empowering the client so that
the lawyer will carry out the client's ends. 4 1 The newer literature explores a
deeper and more troubling aspect of the lawyer-client relationship: the way in
which lawyers create ends so that clients come to want-or at least accept-
what the system is prepared to deliver. 42
Of course, the notion that lawyers manipulate clients so that they will
accept the lawyers' ideas as desirable or feasible is not really new. In the Law
and Society tradition, this theme goes back at least to Abraham Blumberg's
classic study of the way public defenders "cool out" criminal defendants. 43
This theme also appears in Stewart Macaulay's 1979 study of lawyers and
consumer protection, which shows how the lawyers' own political and social
visions and their economic interests lead them to redefine complaints brought
to them by consumer clients. 44 But this idea has been restated recently in
more somber tones.
Perhaps the best statement of this theme in the newer literature can be
found in Sarat and Felstiner's study of divorce lawyers and their clients. 45
Based on observations of lawyer-client interaction and in-depth interviews,
this study demonstrates the complex and subtle ways in which a divorce
lawyer convinces a client to put aside deep emotional feelings and desires for
moral vindication so that the client may accept the resolution that the attorney
believes is feasible. 4 1 The study focuses in detail on the linguistic practices
employed by lawyers to reconstruct the client's subjectivity. 47
Sarat and Felstiner's study illustrates the theme that litigation can
constitute a denial of an authentic self, but perhaps this statement
oversimplifies the complex argument in this rich ethnographic account. The
authors actually describe the process of "legal construction of the client," in
which elements of the client's subjectivity are divided into an "emotional self"
and a "legal self."-48 They do not explicitly invoke notions of authenticity or
denial, yet their article does note that the lawyer "expresses the indifference
of the law to those parts of the self that might be most salient at the time of
the divorce. "4'9
41. E.g.. 1). ROS.NTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: A V IIO'S IN (C.IIAR(;E;? 14, 29-61 (2dt ed. 1977).
42. See Sarat & Fclstiner, Law and S/ra/e'y m Ithe Divorce Lanyei ' Offire, 20 LAw & So(:'v REv. 93,
116-25 (1986).
43. Blumbcrg, supra note 27, at 28.
44. Macaulay, sulpra note 27, at 120-43, 151-66.
45. Sarat & Felstiner, sn/pa note 42.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 94-96.
48. Id. ai 96, 116-25.
49. Id. at 132.
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B. Law and the Construction of Social Reality
In studies of direct lawyer-client relationships, the newer sociology of law
shows a concern with the ways in which contact with the legal process shapes
the self, rather than effectuating the ends of a preexistent subjectivity. 51, The
idea that legal discourse constitutes individuals can also be seen in studies
that demonstrate that individuals' perceptions of law and their own interests
do not predate contact with the legal system but are constructed through such
contacts. This idea appears in an even broader form in statements that all
social relations, even those not directly affected by contact with the legal
system, are shaped or constituted by legal discourse or ideology.5'
The theme of the legal construction of social reality first arose in the
disputes transformation literature. This literature deals with the way in which
disputes are defined and changed as they go through their trajectories. Two
concepts arose from that literature that influenced later work: Mather and
Yngvesson's idea of "rephrasing,- 52 and Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat's analysis
of "naming, blaming, and claiming." 53 Scholars recognized that the process
by which a dispute arises involves three problematic stages: naming a
grievance, blaming some actor for the harm, and claiming some relief.5 4 Each
of these stages is socially constructed; there are no innate ideas that can be
employed to negotiate from a perception of harm to a focused claim.
5 5
Prevailing ideas in legal discourse will shape how individuals react to various
possibilities, and institutional contacts will channel individual behavior.5
Further, at each stage of the process the dispute will be rephrased-recast in
an institutional discourse that may be very different from the initial
understanding of the participants in the dispute.57
The recognition of the socially constructed nature of the process of
dispute transformation has led scholars to pay attention to the micro-
encounters in which the social meaning of a dispute is negotiated. Studies
describe how ideologies about what law is and does are deployed by lawyers
and court officials to deter clients and parties from certain choices and to
assuage suffering caused by lowered expectations and disappointed hopes.
Studies by Merry and by Yngvesson of lower court officials, for example, show
how such officials juxtapose official ideologies about law as a formal rights-
protecting system with "street" notions of law as an arena in which
50. See sapa notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
51. rtibek & Esser. supra note 14, at 20-34.
52. Mather & Yngvesson, Language, ludience, and 1he raiformalion of Disputes. 15 LAW & Soc'I
REV. 775. 777 (1980-81).
53. Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Tran.far mation of Disptes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming
S15 L...w & Soc'N" REV. 631, 634-36 (1980-81).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 637-39.
56. Id. at 639-49.
57. /I. at 637-39. 651; llathe" & Yngvesson. mpra note 52. at 818-21.
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personality and power play a dominant role.58 Sarat and Felstiner's studies of
the lawyer-client relationship display a similar approach. In their analysis of
the ways in which divorce lawyers seek to lower their clients' expectations
about what they can accomplish through law, the lawyers deploy a cynical
picture of the law as manipulable, cold, and arbitrary.5 '
The recent work on disputes transformation deals directly with litigation
and shows how direct contacts with the lawyer and legal system transform or
create what individuals seek and expect from civil justice.611 But the theme of
the legal construction of social reality goes beyond observations of the impact
on subjectivity of actual contact with lawyers and courts. It extends to ways in
which legal discourse penetrates everyday life, affecting the very definition of
relationships and conflicts.
Thus, practices and ideas associated with the law and legal institutions can
be seen as structures of meaning that radiate throughout social life and serve
as part of the material people use to negotiate their understanding of
everyday events and relationships."' The structures of meaning embedded in
legal discourse include very basic notions about what kinds of relationships
are possible and desirable. For example, legal notions of ownership and
property form part of the material used to explain why some people-those
who own or manage factories, schools, and other organizations-have
legitimate power over others. 2 Legal notions about how people in intimate
relationships should deal with each other affect how people define what they
mean by a family. Legal discourse includes subtle methods of valuing certain
kinds of behavior, such as instrumental striving for material goods, and
disvaluing others.
When scholars say that legal discourses constitute social life, they do not
necessarily mean that law is a tight body of closely integrated notions and
valuations that filter down from the higher ideological productions of legal
thought in some mysterious way into everyone's thoughts and feelings. To be
sure, some scholars who write about the way in which legal ideology shapes
social perception and channels social behavior speak as if there were a
58. Nlerry, Concepts of Law andjus/ice .tmog IIo -king-Class .i-ieriani." Ideology as Clt0re. 9 LEGAL
Si un. F. 59 (1985); Yngvesson. Legal Ideology and Comtiuni/Justice in the Clerk s Office, 9 LEGAL Si tD. F.
71 (1985).
59. Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 42, at 99-116.
I1 1he lawyer's description of how judges handle court orders suggests a high level of
inattention and i-outinization. Judges sign orders without reading them to satisfy "people
who really need this stuff." While the judge is said to ignore the substance ofthe order, he
does pay attention to the lawyer or law firm who requests it. The legal process is dhereby
portrayed as responding more to reputation than substantive merit. Thus, the client is
introduced to a system that is hurried, routinized, personalistic, and accident prone.
Id. at 100.
60. See, e.g.. id. at 107-08.
61. Gordon, XVew' Developments in Legal Theo)ry, in THE POLIICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVIE CRIiTIQUE
287-89 (1). Kairys ed. 1982).
62. Fischl, Some Realism ,lbout (ritical bgal Stndies. 41 U. MIAMI I. REV. 505, 526-28 (1986).
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relatively cohesive and widely diffused legal ideology,"3 but others see the
process as extremely loose and malleable.6 4
The position a scholar takes on the malleability question may depend on
the socio-theoretical origins of the notion of social construction that an
individual scholar employs. The theme of the legal construction of everyday
life draws on several bodies of social theory, including critical anthropology,
neo-Marxist structuralism, Critical Legal Studies, and post-structuralist
literary theory. All of these social theories see law as one of several discourses
of power or ideological structures that reinforce relations of power and
conditions of hierarchy. They differ, however, in their views of how discourse
structures relationships. For some at the post-structuralist end of the
spectrum, the process is highly diffuse and ad hoc; actors deploy bits and
pieces of various discourses as they negotiate everyday relationships.6 5 At the
other end of the spectrum, neo-Marxist structural accounts see ideology as
firmly rooted in well-organized structures of power and transmitted through a
series of mutually reinforcing and hegemonic practices.""
The idea that everyday understanding incorporates views produced and
reproduced by the discourses of the law is drawn from disparate strands of
contemporary social theory that picture legal ideology differently.
Nevertheless all these theories see law as one of several discourses or
ideologies that reinforce relations of power and conditions of hierarchy.
Where the liberal view sees law as a shield for autonomy and an instrument
for realizing authentic projects, these critical social theories see legal ideas
and institutions as part of complex processes through which the self is actually
constituted by social relationships and discourses. To one degree or another,
all assert that this social construction of the self through ideology and
language suppresses the full potential of the self."7
C. Law and the Victimization of the Victim
The third theme in the newer literature is "the victimization of the victim"
by law. This term comes from a recent study of antidiscrimination law by
Kristin Bumiller entitled The Civil Rights Society."8 This book, which examines
how victims of discrimination experienced the law and their contacts with
litigation, incorporates several of the themes emerging in the critical
sociology of procedure. Bumiller explores conflicts between the use of law
and realization of the self,' shows how law is used in everyday discourse to
63. See 1-uLnt, The Ideology of Law: ..Idvanmes and Pioblems in Recent .-Ipplicalions oJ the Conrcept of ldeology
to the. Iatysis of1 Law, 19 I AW & Soc'y REV. II (1985). See also Trubek, Wl'here the .lctioi Is: Critical Legal
Studies and Empiricism. 36 S'T.N. I.. REXV. 575. 610-15 (1984); Trubek & Esser, supina note 14, at 27.
64. See Coombe, Roon foi .laitoeinei: oward a Them of Piactice in Critical Legal Studies. 14 LAw &
SoC. INQUIRY 69 (1989).
65. See id. at 91-93.
66. See Hun , sul/a note 63, at 13-19.
67. See. e .g. Gabel, s~n/a note 31.
68. K. BIUMIIIER. TiE (xvii. Ri(;n-jls SOCIETY 2 (1988).
69. d. at 109.
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construct identity,7 1T and recognizes that the way social knowledge is
constructed affects the nature of the society we live in. 7 1
Bumiller's central argument, however, is that "antidiscrimination law
serves to reinforce the victimization of its 'beneficiaries.' "72 She recognizes
that law may fail to respond to the demands of the subject, as Sarat and
Felstiner suggest; she also recognizes that legal discourse plays a role in the
construction of our identities, as the writers on legal ideology argue. But
Bumiller goes even further: In her critique of antidiscrimination law she
contends that, in actual operation, this body of law and the procedures
associated with it may have an effect directly opposed to the law's alleged
purposes. If antidiscrimination law victimizes its putative beneficiaries, it does
not just fail to prevent discrimination; it perpetuates it.7-
Bumiller reaches this radical conclusion through a rich and complex
argument that goes well beyond questions of procedure, even as it is most
broadly defined. The study, however, contributes directly to our
understanding of the social visions underlying procedural thought.
Bumiller's study challenges some of the reigning assumptions about litigation
and procedure. She has a devastating critique of the implicit psychology
employed in much thinking about procedure, and she places in question
Realist and post-Realist assumptions that more effective procedural
mechanisms can, by enhancing access to justice, easily guarantee that rights
will be made effective.
Bumiller's study started with the observation that people who perceived
themselves to be discriminated against are much less likely than others who
perceive harms either to complain or to seek legal redress.7 4 In her research,
she sought an explanation for these disparities. Her method was to explore
70. Id. at 30-33.
71. Id. at 32-38. Btimiller explicitly seeks a social science method which will reveal the victim's
perspective and, by so doing, create the possibility for social transformation. Concluding the
methodological section of the book, she says: "This work is motivated by the desire to make social
science research more responsive to the problem of social oppression and the stultifying realitv of-
everyday life .... I hope that the interpretation of these social realities can create a liberating vision
of alternative possibilities.' Id. at 38. For a filier description of this theme, called herein the
discursivity of social knowledge, see infta notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
72. K. BuiIL FR. sapra note 68, at 39.
73. it is usefull to note the diflerence between Bumiller's critique of antidiscriinnation law and
more conventional analyses of the failure of legal reform by Law and Society scholars. As Sarat has
pointed out, one of the staple products of Law and Society research is the gap sttidy, which mneasures
the gap between the goals of legal policy and the restlts that legal policy produces. Sarat, Lqeal
Effectiveness and Social Studies of Law: On the Unfortunale Persistence of a Research D"adition. 9 LEA;L. STUD.
F. 23 (1985). Such studies recognize that legal reforms may fail to achieve their goals, such as
elimination of racial discrimination, but tahey do not cfestion the legal order's commitment to these
goals. BUiniller's analysis of antidiscrimination law, on the other hand, challenges this commitment.
She explicitly rejects the galp study approach to the StUd of civil rights laws. K. BUMILI.R, supra note
68, at 25-26. Rather, she stresses the positive ways in which the existence of antidiscrimination law
reinforces victimization. Id. at 2, 39. Thus, she suggests, protective legislation may result in
perpetuation of patterns of behavior that maintain discriminatory practices. See id. at 1 10-11.
74. K. BuMi.i.LR, su/ra note 68, at 26-30. These observations were drawn finom a nationwide
survey conducted by the Civil Litigation Research Project. For a complete report of the survey, see
Miller & Sarat, Grievaoces, Claimas, and Di.srul/es: ,Assessiag the.-Idversarv Cultre, 15 lAW & Soc's RFv. 525
(1980-81).
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the psychology of discrimination victims through in-depth interviews. 75
These interviews led Bumiller to develop an account of the psychology of
people affected by discrimination which is directly at odds with the implicit
psychology in mainstream thinking about civil procedure.
As previously suggested, the mainstream tradition assumes that
autonomous subjects are motivated to secure knowledge of their rights and to
pursue them through litigation if necessary. In this social vision, litigation is a
natural act through which the individual affirms her will. This individualist,
will-based account was central in classical thought and was not significantly
changed by the Realists. Realism recognized that rights may be uncertain,
and that there may be economic and institutional barriers to litigation, but the
Realists did not question that people would be motivated to assert rights that
had been set forth in the law and thus publicly known.
In her analysis of victims' motivations to use and not to use
antidiscrimination law, Bumiller argues that there are strong psychological
barriers that prevent discrimination victims both from perceiving
discriminatory acts as violations of legally cognizable rights, and from
asserting such rights if they do. She notes that in order to become a plaintiff
in an antidiscrimination complaint, a person must state that he has been
victimized. 7" That is, the very act of using the law demands the assumption of
the label of "victim" of proscribed actions. But, she stresses, much in the lives
of the people she studied causes them to want to avoid taking on the "mask of
the victim."-7 7 The class of people allegedly protected by antidiscrimination
law is subjected to constant assaults on its identity by racism, sexism, and
other sources of hostility.7 8 To deal with these threats, Bumiller posits,
people in a supposedly protected class develop what she refers to as an "ethic
of survival," which stresses their capacity to cope with unjust situations.70 To
claim victimhood publicly, as the law demands, threatens the sense of control
which people in this situation derive from this ethic.,"
Bumiller does not assert that this coping strategy is the sole reason why
victims may not be able to see their situations as violations of legal claims.
The other side of the picture is their fear of the law and the power of the
organizations against which they would have to assert claims. The law seems
alien and uncertain, and their opponents powerful and knowing. To use the
law, they must portray themselves as victims, thus giving up a self-identity that
has allowed them to cope. But this sacrifice will not guarantee success; quite
the contrary, they often think that they will lose in court even if they deeply
believe that an injustice has occurred. These peoples' fear of losing control
far exceeds their hopes for vindication through law. Thus, Bumiller
concludes:
75. K. BuM1.ILF, supra note 68, at 29-30.
76. Id. at 99.
77. Id. at 62-64.
78. 1I. al 84.
79. /I. at 78-97.
80. Id. at 93-95.
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The results of my interviews show that people who have experienced discriminatory
treatment resist engagement in legal tactics because they stand in awe of the power of
the law to disrupt their daily lives. At the same time, they are cynical about the power
of the law actually to help them secure the jobs, housing, and other opportunities they
lay claim to. They fear that, if they seek a legal resolution, they will not improve their
position but will lose control of a hostile situation. These respondents also feel that
asserting their legal rights would not enable them to express their sense of dignity but
would force them to justify their worthiness against a more powerful opponent. 8 1
Bumiller demonstrates that law threatens dignity and involves the risk of
losing a sense of autonomy and control, but she reports an added note of
cynicism-the belief that a person will not only lose his authentic self if he
enters the legal system, but he will not get anything in return since the law is
powerless. Thus, Bumiller is critical of the way in which the whole structure
of civil rights law works. She argues that a system that forces the victim of
discrimination to become a victim of the legal process in order to remedy the
original harms is a system that cannot work. Indeed, the victims she describes
are in a classic Catch-22 situation: They can restore the dignity they have lost
through discrimination only by submitting to the indignity of the law.
Because it is clear that only a few hardy (or foolhardy) people will do so, she
suggests, the law will always fail to reach its ostensible goals.8 2 Finally, the
practical hollowness of the promise casts doubt on the sincerity of the
promise itself. If the legal system were really interested in stopping race, age,
and gender discrimination, would it have forced the victims into the
Kafkaesque situations that Bumiller's respondents' stories describe? Those
who accept the argument of this study will not imagine that some new
procedural devices will serve to cure the fundamental flaws to which she has
pointed.
D. The Communitarian Alternative and the Critique of Adjudication
The critical literature discussed so far deals primarily with the discursive
constitution of subjects. Studies of lawyer-client interaction, the ideology of
the law in everyday life, and the victimization of the victim challenge the
liberal account of the autonomous subject. But Law and Society scholars have
also contributed to the development of a more communitarian perspective on
litigation. In so doing, they have contributed to an understanding of
implications that the idea of a contextual self might have for civil procedure.
To be sure, these efforts neither amounted to a full-blown communitarian
theory ofjustice nor led to widespread legal reforms. Nevertheless, Law and
Society scholars did articulate some criticisms of adjudication that reflected
dissatisfaction with liberal ideas about the relationship between law and
society, and their work did lend some support to radical efforts to develop
new methods to handle disputes.
There are two themes in the Law and Society literature that suggest the
presence of communitarian concerns: (1) concern about the impact of dispute
81. 1d. at 109.
82. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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processing on social relationships; and (2) interest in communal sources of
normative order.
One major concern of Law and Society work on litigation has been the fear
that adjudication is harmful to long-term social relationships. :  Law and
Society scholarship highlighted several features of adjudication that could
make it difficult for parties to continue social relationships if they had to go to
court over disputes within the relationship. Among these were: the winner-
take-all aspect of civil remedies, in which normally one party must win
everything and the other lose all; the structure of the adversarial system,
which encourages each side to push its case to the full; and the backward-
looking feature of adjudication, which seeks to resolve issues in the past,
rather than look for ways to maintain relations in the future.,' Because of
these aspects of adjudication, persons in long-term relationships who have
disputes might have to choose whether to enter the courts and sacrifice valued
relations, or to shun the courts and thus be denied a forum to air grievances.8 -
The second communitarian theme concerned the use of norms drawn
from living communities to resolve disputes. Critics of formal legal
institutions thought thatjustice would be better served if the norms employed
in dispute processing were drawn from the communities in which people lived
their lives. In that way, communities would be strengthened and disputes
handled more effectively.86
One institutional project reflected both these concerns: the effort to
develop community-based mediation for many disputes.87 This short-lived
movement sought to create another kind of justice. By using mediation
instead of adjudication, it sought to encourage the preservation of troubled
relationships. By drawing mediators from the community, it sought to
strengthen communal institutions in an increasingly atomistic society.
The critique of formal justice and interest in community-based mediation
reflect a vision of self and society very different from the liberal individualism
that still dominates mainstream thinking about civil procedure. To be sure,
this alternative vision was never fully developed. Scholarly concern over the
impact of adjudication on social relationships did not lead to any major
83. Among the factors that generated these concerns were the findings of legal anthropologists
concerning models of dispute processing in non-WVestern societies. These models, it was believed,
diflered from the approach of civil procedure in Western courts. For example, reporting on the
operation of a Mexican Zapotec court, Laura Nader noted that among the features of Zapotec dispute
processing were compromise solutions and consideration of the relevance of networks of social
relations, features not normally associated with Western models of adjudication. Nader, St'les of
Court Procedure: To Make The Bolorce, in LAW IN CuLTURE & SocIEr 87-88 (L. Nader ed. 1969).
84. See Silbev & Sarat, Dispute Piocessing ii Law and Legal Scholarship: horn Institotional Critique to the
Reconstruction oftlefrridical Subject, 66 DENVER U. L. RE-v. 437,452-54 (1989). See generaly Yngvesson,
Re-exanining Continuing Relations arid the Laow, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 623.
85. Silbev & Sarat. sipra note 84, at 454.
86. This was an implicit ideal in the literature of legal anthropology. See, e.g.. Nader, sIpra note
83. See also Galanter, fusice i Maniy Rootos. Courts. Privale Orderig, arid Indigenous Law. 19 J. L.A,
PIURAL.ISM & UNOFFrersI.CIA. 1 (1981).
87. For a full account, see Wahr-haftig, -. Overvri'fCorr I erted Citizen Di.Npite Resorluion
Progrons in the U'nited Slates, in I lIE Poi'rrcs oF INFORMAIt JisTrlcE 75 (R. Abel ed. 1982).
Page I111: ALuumn 1988]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
rethinking of the ideals of legal individualism. Law and Society scholars, by
and large, were content to observe that relational concerns might explain
some patterns of court use and non-use, while the proponents of community-
based mediation were concerned with small-scale local reforms, not sweeping
social transformation. Moreover, even the modest reform proposals that
came out of this era largely failed, and the community-based mediation
movement was swallowed up by moves to institutionalize ADR within the
court system itself.88
Nonetheless, these modest efforts did point away from the individualist
model of justice still prevalent in mainstream thinking, suggesting the
emergence of doubts about classical notions of autonomous selfhood.
Indeed, in a recent discussion of the movement to create alternatives to
adjudication, Robert A. Baruch Bush argues that, within this movement, one
can discover a "Communitarian or Relational vision of society in which the
greatest good is the connection of the individual self to others in
interpersonal and communal relations.' ' 1' Bush notes, however, that this
vision is only one of several to be found in the ADR movement, and that to
date it has not been adequately developed/J
E. The Critique of ADR and the Discourses of Need
Law and Society scholarship, however, has not sought to develop the
communitarian vision latent in the critique of formal justice. Forcomplex
reasons, the emphasis in recent scholarship has shifted to a critique of the
ADR movement itself. This is a rich literature, in which man), issues are
pursued.& ' Only one is mentioned here: the critique of the use of a
behavioral science discourse of need as a justification for ADR. In recent
years it has been suggested that the behavioral sciences offer a resource that
can be used to resolve some kinds of disputes, especially marital disputes,
better than they can be handled through adjudication."2 The argument for
the use of such ADR techniques as divorce mediation has met with strong
criticism from the Law and Society community. This literature raises once
again the question of the discursive constitution of subjectivity.
The discourses of need, which have come under critical attack, are based
on a redefinition of the self and part company with classical liberal notions.
But the self that emerges from this linkage of ADR and the behavioral
sciences is both dependent and decontextualized. For this reason, critical
sociologists of law have challenged behavioral science justifications of ADR.'eI
88. Silbey & Sarat, supra note 84, at 455-57.
89. Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute Resoiltion: Taxonomies and .-Iti-iaxonomies of Quality ,'1gnuents,
66 DEN. U.L. REV. 335, 376 (1989). Bush sees the whole ADR movement as a potential move
towards a relational vision, but fears that the communitarian vision may he overwhelmed by other
approaches. Id. at 378-79.
90. Id. at 379.
91. See, e.g., "lHE. POLITICS OF INFORMAl JUsTICE, supra note 87 (two vols.).
92. See generally Milne & Folberg, The Theory and Practice of Divorce .1ediation: In Oveniew, in
I)VORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (J. Folberg & A. Milne eds. 1988).
93. Silbey & Sarat, supia note 84, at 470-96.
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In the eyes of the critics, some ADR proponents want to redefine the legal
subject as a source of needs, not a bearer of rights. As Silbey and Sarat have
noted, "[in the move [from rights] to needs the juridical subject is provided
with a more complicated, richer human character. Yet that character stands at
some distance from itself and, as a result, presents an incomplete
understanding of 'real' needs.'19 The newly defined subject paradoxically is
radically dependent upon, yet extracted from, social context. In brief, this
subject has no language with which to deal with uncompromisable issues.
These critics seem to be searching for a contextual vision of the self. Yet,
unlike some earlier Law and Society scholars, they see ADR in negative terms.
The revision of the self implicit in the move to the discourse of needs, they
fear, may be worse than the liberal view it replaces. This critique of ADR has
two dimensions. The first challenges the way in which informal processes
change the questions that the law asks. Thus, it is suggested that ADR has
shifted the epistemological foundations of the law. As a result, "[r]ights talk is
by no means displaced; it is, however, transformed, and, in some ways
domesticated, in the face of the discourses of interest and needs."' 5 The shift
from vindication of rights to satisfaction of needs changes the way in which
conflicts will be resolved. New modes of expressing and realizing needs are
valorized, and everything becomes a problem of personality; how to change,
modify, and mold behavior become the key questions. ", At the same time,
needs become reified and come to reflect some essential component of human
nature; thev therefore embody some universal essence which all can recognize
and share.97 The problem with this epistemological shift is that a different
and, in many cases, hidden authority is created for and by specific actors in the
legal system whose job is to service needs. A new and arguably more
insidious form of control is instantiated in this microphysics of power.',,
The second element of the critique focuses more on changes in outcomes
associated with the shift to ADR. Where the first element highlights the
subtle power shifts within law associated with the discourse of need, the
second focuses on who wins and who loses in the new systems. The second
element of the critique has focused on divorce mediation, one of the most
significant results of the ADR movement.
Perhaps the most powerful voice in the critique of the effects of ADR and
the discourses of need is family law scholar Martha Fineman. '" Fineman
shares with the critical sociologists a concern for how behavioral discourse has
come to replace rights analysis, but she relates this to a very concrete set of
concerns-the impact of these changes on divorced mothers.'")' Fineman's
94. Id. at 491.
95. Id. at 497 (foouimtc omitted).
96. Id. at 490-96.
97. Id. at 492-94.
98. See N. Foucm\uir, I)ISCPI'I.INE AND PUNISH, S111a note 28, at 139.
99. Fineman, Domiinan Disrniise, Professioal Language, and Legal Change in Child Cusod),
beosionaking. 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988).
100. Id. at 729-30.
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argument is impassioned and contextualized. By focusing on effects as well as
processes, she shows precisely and eloquently why the shift to the needs of the
emotional self has been deleterious.
Fineman's argument, in short, is that the behavioral science rhetoric of
social workers has come to dominate legal decisionmaking, thereby
constructing a hegemonic enclave in which social workers can advance their
own professional interests. Her argument suggests that, like Silbey and
Sarat, IoI she fears that the reconstruction of the law by the discourses of need
will permit an even more finely controlled mapping of behavior.'0 2 What
makes Fineman's argument particularly compelling is that she shows how this
situation is actually a tragedy for many divorced mothers.
Once assigned a relatively minor role in the divorce process under the
fault system, social workers in the no-fault divorce era have redefined divorce
as an emotional crisis. "" Billing themselves as experts in the management of
emotions and therapeutic reconciliation, they have effectuated dramatic
changes in the divorce process; in particular, they have been key actors in
redefining the standard for child custody from the "best interest of the child"
to joint custody. 1 14 Divorce, once a potentially emancipatory event for
Women, becomes a condition of continued dependency because of the
demand that ongoing relationships be retained between divorcing spouses.
The power of the dominant discourses of the helping professions maintains
the indeterminate legal status of mothers and children by focusing on the
need to keep the family together at least symbolically, if not concretely.
Fineman's account of divorce mediation makes it look like the utopian
moment in ADR gone awry. Rather than deal with the concrete experience of
a self defined by context, the social work profession and the mediation
process have helped to create a series of fictions that many want to believe:
Men and women have equal interests and abilities to parent; relationships
never have to end acrimoniously, but can always be worked out; and men and
women are equal in economic and symbolic terms. l 15 Yet the result of these
fictions is that this discourse "has created rather than reflected reality." 1"
What Fineman's article indicates is that the experience of many individuals
does not comport with these fictions. In effect, the legacy of ADR is the
circulation of a certain type of discourse that aggrandizes sharing, caring, and
ongoing relationships embedded in a continued familial structure, while
effectively ignoring the contextualized self. In the name of contextualization,
this discourse creates an illusory subjectivity which can then be controlled by
the discourse of need.
101. Silbey & Sarat, supia note 84, at 490-96.
102. Fineman, supra note 99, at 733, 744-60.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 731-35, 740-44.
105. Id. at 731-35, 744-45, 751 n.102.
106. Id. at 761.
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F. The Discursivity of Social Knowledge
The final theme that one can detect in the work of many scholars who are
producing the newer literature on civil disputes, litigation, and procedure
deals not with law but with social knowledge itself. It represents a rethinking
of the nature and purpose of empirical research. This rethinking is not
limited to the disputes and litigation area but affects the whole of social
science research in and about law. Many of the scholars who have written
extensively about litigation, lawyer-client relationships, ADR, and the other
themes outlined aboveI0 7 have at the same time been engaged in a broader
epistemological critique. As a result, their work in the sociology of civil
procedure manifests a different attitude toward the process of research than
that reflected in most of the post-Realist Law and Society work.
The term "discursivity of social knowledge" refers to the idea that fields of
knowledge such as legal scholarship and the sociology of law are discourses
that contribute to the construction of society, and not neutral mirrors that
simply reflect an objective social reality. In recent years, scholars in many
fields have come to realize that representations of society affect the way in
which society is understood and organized.ltox This recognition has led them
to accept the proposition that scholars have a responsibility to investigate the
values their work embraces and the social projects it supports. In the Law and
Society tradition, this recognition has caused some to question whether the
sociology of law has been sufficiently attentive to the effects produced in
society by its choice of questions, its methods of inquiry, and its techniques of
interpretation. ' -1' Furthermore, recognition of discursivity has led Law and
Society scholars to seek more distance from official dogmas, policy goals, and
alleged reform agendas. '[
The impact of this new consciousness can be seen in the literature
reviewed above and in the themes it has generated. Two salient features of
this work stand out. First, there is a willingness to question the broader social
vision embodied in current thinking about law and enshrined in current
procedural institutions. As has been shown, the newer literature does not
take for granted the stories that mainstream legal thought tells about the
nature of self, society, and law. Rather, the authors of the newer literature
107. Noteworthy among these are Kristin Bumiller, Austin Sarat, and Susan Silbev. For a
discussion of Bumiller's views on social knowledge, see supra note 71. Sarat and Silbev have written
extensivelv on these questions. See supra note 24 and sources cited iherein.
108. Examples of this can be found in feminist scholarship. See generally FENIINIST
STUDIES/CRITICAL STUDIES (T. de Lauretis ed. 1986): C. WEE.uON, NEMINIST PRACTICE AN)
POSTSTRUCrt'URASLTISttEORY (1987). For examples in other fields, see A. GiDDENS. IHE
CONST-rIJIoN OF SOCtwTx: Ou'r.tNE OF TitE ItIEORY OF STRtICTURA-TION (1984) (sociology): Collier &
Yanagisako, Toward a U "nified..Inaly.sis of Gender and Kinship, in GENDEP.R ANi) KINSItP: EssAYs TOWARO A
UNittEn ANAxtSIS 14 (. Collier & S. Yanagisako eds. 1987) (anthropology).
109. For a review of some recent Law and Society work that has begun to recognize that social
knowledge constitutes society-that is, is discursive-and the implications of this recognition on
questions, methods, and interpretive techniques, see fTlruhek & Esser, supra note 14. See also Trubek,
.1pra note 63.
110. See, e.g., Silbey & Sarat, The Pull of the Policy .udience, supra note 24.
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recognize that these stories rest on contestable social visions. They are
prepared to bring these contestable assumptions to light for critical
evaluation. And they have shown a willingness, at times, to assert alternative
visions like the communitarian notion of the contextual self.
Second, these authors are willing to articulate the voices of people and
groups who are affected by the law but whose perspective is overlooked or
downplayed in mainstream thought. These authors are self-conscious about
their role in a process of the construction of fields of knowledge that will have
an impact on social life, and they are concerned that this process reflect
viewpoints other than those of academic elites. This concern is apparent in
the way Sarat and Felstiner show us the perspective of clients whose hopes for
the law are dashed by the manipulative behavior of lawyers.'' It is clear in
Bumiller's self-conscious decision to provide a voice for women of color and
other victims ensnared in a legal process ostensibly designed to protect
them.' 12 This concern comes through most forcefully in Fineman's
impassioned efforts to demonstrate how the interests of divorced mothers and
their children have been overlooked by those who seek to transform the




The combination of themes emerging in the sociology of civil procedure
demonstrates how the development of a critical practice is taking Law and
Society scholarship beyond the limits established in the post-Realist period.
The scholars whose work has been summarized here are a small group, and
their work makes up a modest portion of all the empirical research being done
today on disputes, litigation, and procedure. But because they have staked
out a new and more critical role for empirical scholarship, their initial efforts
represent an important and novel phase of the empirical tradition initially
launched by the Realists as an instrumental adjunct to procedural reform.
Started as a largely technical handmaiden to the work of mainstream
reformers, the sociology of civil procedure is moving toward a full-blown
critical practice in which Law and Society scholars are as likely to question the
goals of the legal system as to embrace them. That move, if fully carried out,
would be the true handmaiden's revenge.
I I I. See Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 42.
112. See K. BumIIER. supina note 68: Bumiller, I "cims in the Shadow of/he Law: A Crilique of/he Model
o/Legal l'rotec/ion. 12 SIGNs: J. WVOMEN CuurURE & SoCs 421 (1987).
1 13. Fineman, supna note 99.
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